Some versions of structuralism consider actors to be necessary for structural analysis; others argue that they are not. All versions of structuralism consider social structure to be analytically independent of actors. I show through examples and subsequently through deduction that this position is wrong. That is, any conceptualization of social structure necessarily involves a conception of its constituent actors. Moreover, I generalize this point to argue that the structure of scientific knowledge follows a multilevel modeling approach: theory at every level (...) of aggregation is based on actor models of appropriate units. Several practical benefits result from using actor models explicitly in structural analysis in particular, and from following the multilevel modeling approach in general. (shrink)

This article presents a model of the production of human behaviour, grounded in a pragmatist perspective. The model has two components: a small set of considered behaviours, and a set of motivators which I group into four subsets: material, reproductive, and two sets of attributional motivators. The model is based on a minimum principle. A person performs that considered behaviour which comes closest to ideal in light of the person's motivators. I show that both declining marginal utility and satisfying follow (...) as deductions from the model. In addition, especially with the inclusion of attributional motivators, the model accounts for a variety of findings in social science. I also show how it can generate theory and testable empirical predictions. (shrink)

Dennett (1995) argues that memes or cultural replicators are largely autonomous of genes, and that they are fairly efficacious in determining who we are and what we do. I argue that Dennett's arguments are wrong in several aspects, which we can see by analyzing processes at appropriate levels. Specifically, I argue that it is not true that we as persons are created largely by memes, that our memes are not largely independent of our genes, and that we can use the (...) universality of memes to make inferences about genetic predispositions. Finally, by suggesting an innate psychological mechanism for morality, I argue that morality may be largely the effect of genetic predispositions rather than autonomous. (shrink)